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The editor of this journal has asked for our opinion on the article by
Wilson (2012). In the interests of open dialogue we have agreed. We
do not intend to critique the article in detail or to select specific
sentences that we agree or disagree with. Our aim is to highlight what
we consider important relevant issues.
Is it ethical to practice what we personally like and believe in,
according to our tradition and professional background?
First, let us make it clear that we agree debate and discussion are
important. We also believe that when examining questions of signifi-
cant social, clinical, practice and policy relevance it is important to
start with a hypothesis. As observed by a family therapist, it is equally
important ‘not to fall in love’ with our hypotheses (Rivett, 2012) and
to test them rigorously. Our view is that hypotheses need to be empiri-
cally tested and challenged. This makes the difference between pro-
nouncements that reflect personal views or professional preferences
and those that reflect evidence. It is our opinion and that of many
others that it is unethical and at times dangerous to attempt to help
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people according to our personal views and professional preferences.
For those of us who are employed as public sector employees, where
families are referred to us, our task is to provide help that has been
shown (not by us necessarily) to be effective and that is feasible and
pragmatic.
The dichotomization of biological/medical and
non-biological/non-medical is unhelpful and incorrect
It is not completely clear to us whether the author is or is not
attempting to dichotomize explanations and conceptualizations that
are genetic/biological/medical and those that are non-biological/
non-medical. We wish to emphasize that dichotomization is not
only unhelpful but also factually incorrect. Firstly, the social/non-
biological and biological cannot be separated (Rutter, 2007). Psycho-
social adversity can result in biological and brain changes (Hackman
et al., 2010; Meaney and Szyf, 2005). Such changes can in turn result
in or exacerbate social adversity or psychosocial stressors. Studies of
risk factors, including genetic ones, show that most mental health
problems and normal forms of behaviour are a complex mix of
inherited and non-inherited factors that co-act and interact in a
dynamic fashion (Thapar et al., 2007). Many genetically sensitive,
longitudinal, experimental and treatment studies (Ge et al., 1996;
Reid et al., 2002) show evidence of circular or cyclical, not purely
linear, causality. Secondly, the nature of interventions and the origins
of a problem are separate. For example, phenylketonuria is caused
by one faulty gene (as noted later, attention deficit hyperactivity dis-
order [ADHD] is more complex) but the treatment of choice is
dietary intervention.
Personal and professional preferences, when they prevent us
from staying updated and from critically evaluating the
literature and knowledge on topics we do not like or value, are
potentially dangerous
The author highlights an important point. He mentions a father who
believes 95 per cent of his son’s ADHD is genetic. This interpretation
is incorrect. ADHD is influenced by a complex mixture of genes,
environment and their interplay that increase risk in a probabilistic
fashion. There is no single cause and research findings are commonly
misinterpreted and oversimplified. Presumably this father’s informa-
tion has come from reading heritability estimates of ADHD that do
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not mean 95 per cent of an individual’s ADHD is genetic. For the
purpose of this commentary we do not intend to provide detailed
explanations of ADHD aetiology that can be found elsewhere (Taylor
and Sonuga Barke, 2008; Thapar et al., 2012). However the point is
that, regardless of our personal interests and professional prefer-
ences, we need to stay updated to provide good quality information
and explanation to families who might misinterpret evidence. For
example, we might not be trained family therapists but when evi-
dence emerges (Eisler and Lask, 2008) we need to update ourselves
and ensure the effective new interventions are implemented. We
might not like genetics but when evidence emerges we need to under-
stand and appraise it so that we are able to communicate and clarify
findings to families who ask.
If we dispense with diagnostic labels including ADHD for those
who are having serious problems, what are the alternatives?
We need methods that serve a useful purpose and have some sort of
external validity (Wilcutt et al., 2012). They need to allow practitioners
to communicate with each other, their clients and the wider commu-
nity and that will allow us to employ interventions that have been
tested on people with similar presentations, not ones we necessarily
prefer or are best trained in ourselves. That does not mean to say we
should view people only within the context of their diagnostic terms.
That leads us to our next point.
We are not suggesting that evidence-based practice and the use
of diagnosis means there is no place for common sense
Firstly, individuals who are given the same diagnosis (regardless of
whether it relates to mental or physical health or both) are not the
same. Diagnoses do not and should not define people. They are there
as a tool. Just because people have the same diagnosis does not mean
that they will be treated in the same way. Clinical and practitioner
creativity and flexibility and tailoring the intervention to the indi-
vidual and context are critical, as is user preference. Evidence-based
approaches and national treatment and assessment guidelines do not
mean we need to be unthinking. Secondly, diagnostic terms are not set
in stone nor are they perfect representations of reality, and nor should
they be revered (Rutter, 2011). They are a tool that provides a frame-
work for evaluating evidence, applying it and communicating it.
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Diagnostic systems are flexible and have to be revised according to
evidence, which means there will be change. Most mental health
problems (such as ADHD and autism traits) and many physical health
problems (for example, blood pressure/hypertension, blood glucose
levels/diabetes) can be viewed as lying on a continuum. What is called
disorder for these types of problems (unlike qualitatively distinct
models of, for example, infectious disease) are extremes of continua
that result in impairments and adverse consequences. The level of
impairment will depend not only on the severity of the individual’s
characteristics but also on the interaction between it and the environ-
ment. If those with a propensity to diabetes were living in times of
food shortage, this could confer advantage but that is not the case at
present in high-income countries. To consider a medical model as
purely innate/biological is an oversimplification.
We need to be careful about being profession-centred.
What about the families?
The ultimate aim of practitioners and researchers is to deliver help or
establish evidence that, in the long run, helps individuals who are
suffering or seeking help. Debate and critically evaluating practice
and evidence are helpful but only as long as divided opinions and the
polarization of team members does not result in nihilism, idiosyncratic
practice or adverse effects on the well-being of those who seek our
help. We must be careful where there is strong disagreement between
clinical team members, even if these are unspoken, that this does not
interfere with our engagement with families. We also need to listen to
what children and their families say and take service user views into
consideration.
Conclusion
It is good to have dialogue and challenge current thinking but it is an
academic luxury, in our view, to challenge without providing alterna-
tive empirically testable proposals. Where conceptualizations, per-
sonal beliefs and instinct-led interventions are offered to help families
and children we need to be assured that such recommendations are
evidence-based, pragmatic and affordable before services and practi-
tioners might be expected to flexibly adapt to changes in evidence –
irrespective of whether the evidence is incompatible with our personal
beliefs or professional and practice preferences.
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